In infrastructure projects, the government can solve the problem of financing projects by using its internal resources and direct costs or by concluding contracts that are accompanied by financing in addition to the implementation of the project. This article tries to supply different types of these contracts including Construction, Operation and Transfer (BOT), Buyback, Joint Venture and Engineering, Procurement, Construction Finance (EPCF) with emphasis on BOT contracts since these contracts are becoming increasingly important due to the difficulties of developing countries in financing projects using government direct costs. The results of this article indicate that in each of the infrastructure projects, a specific type of these contracts may be applied and none of these methods are weak or strong on their own. The financing method which can provide the interests of the contact parties is variable depending on the nature of the project or intended pattern and the political and economic conditions ruling the host country. BOT's method is increasing in developing and financing infrastructure projects of developing countries which are in dire need of financing projects. It should be noted that this article is written in a descriptive-analytical manner.

As the public sector debt has increased over the past few decades, the importance of using the capacities of the private sector is noticed more than ever; However, operationalizing a public-private partnership contract requires an appropriate legal basis depending on the subject of the partnership and the form of contract. Although, in some cases, the legislator has pointed out the government’ s duty, in general and temporarily, to make use of public-private partnership in Iran, the problem of choosing an appropriate form of such partnerships is still existing regardless of the existence of jurisprudential origins of these kind of contracts. Even though the totality of the partnership contracts refers to the partnership contract in jurisprudence, in some cases it moves away from partnership contract and approaches subjects such as persons’ rent and contract of reward (Ja'alah). Even if in the current Iranian legal system, there are opportunities for making use of a variety of civil partnership and service contracts for public-private participation, this research and its findings show that construction contracts, operation, transfer (BOT) are the most appropriate form for such partnerships.

This study explains the individual’s behavior toward profits and losses contained in differently framed combined incentive contracts. Individual’s risk preferences and loss preferences are measured using Holt and Laury (2002) measure of risk aversion and Brink and Rankin (2013) measure of loss aversion, respectively. The last measure was adjusted with compensation characteristics in Iran. The relationship between these preferences and individual’s behavior under economically equivalent contracts of different frames is examined using experiment. Participating 92 subjects as well as conducting four separate experiments, the result indicated that there is a negative relationship between loss aversion and accepatance of contracts which have penalty component. Also, subjects preferred the first clawback contract (bonus> penalty) rather than the second clawback contract (bonus< penalty). In other words, contracts framing as well as endowment effect play a vital role in individual choices. Failure of common economic theories in explaining of individual behavior is confirmed in this study.

Ensuring a healthy environment involves and protects human beings and besides enjoying this right man has a commitment to protect it. The need to pay attention to the environment should be considered in parallel with the productive activities as a pillar of sustainable development. With regard to the position that the oil industry has found in today's world it should not be overlooked for human and environmental damage and we should look for solutions to reduce these injuries. Oil operations such as exploration development exploitation transportation and oil refining on the environment have devastating effects that can be controlled and reduced by measures. In this regard governments try to reduce the environmental impact of oil operations by setting laws and regulations. In this paper the emphasis on compliance with environmental requirements and the preservation of human rights of the environment has been addressed by the review of environmental laws and regulations and oil issues.

Energy Service Contract is an important method for energy saving. While taking some degree of risk, Energy Service Companies implement the energy-saving projects in the form of energy performance contracts for energy consumers (clients). This kind of contracts enjoy some new, subtle and different features. The question is whether this type of contract can be classified as a new contractual form? If not under which type of existing contract forms are they classified? In this paper, the framework of shared savings and guaranteed savings contracts as the main types of energy performance contracts is reviewed. Documents issued by the Ministry of Petroleum are compared to some certain contracts, including sales, promise of reward, hire-purchase and partnership; it is concluded that this specific kind of contract, is not compatible with any of the definite contract types mentioned above. Hence these contracts should be recognized under the principle of sovereignty and freeness of wills, Article 10 of the Civil Code. it is argued that these contracts are not marred by the risk of loss, so they are not defying the specific terms of law. it is argued that the structure of shared saving contracts is the same as of the reward contract under the definite contracts.

However, in the Iranian legal system, a legal entity called "administrative contract" has not been identified and despite the efforts of public law jurists, such a path has not gone well. But it seems that in Iran, in the shadow of the requirements of the modern state, some of the administrative contracts here, specifically the mandatory ones, have been in place for decades, and promise to establish a law known in the Roman-German tradition as an "administrative contract. " The present article answers this question by understanding such importance: What are the grounds and problems of the birth of administrative contracts through compulsory contracts in the Iranian system? In response to this question, using the research method descriptive-analytical, these results have been obtained. First,Compulsory contracts in Iran are, in many cases, functionally the same as administrative contracts. Second,Due to the occurrence of such a situation, one can hope for the legal recognition and establishment of administrative contracts in Iran and in this way it got rid of the confusion that prevails in the current atmosphere. Third,Despite the legislature's railing for the birth of administrative contracts in Iran, there are many obstacles in front of this legal institution in Iran. Fourth, The focus of these obstacles is in the view of the Guardian Council on the issue of the contract.

Lien is the right of recoupment by one party until liability fulfillment by other party. This right becomes binding in exchange contracts such as: sale and rent (lease). The main criteria for separationg them from non- exchange contracts is commitment and confrontation between parties, such that if one of these two is removed, the contrant will not been of exchange type. In addition to describing A major reason for conducting this research is investigation of the lien enforcement domain and lacking of its application for sale as well as highlighting its effects and consequences in mutual interest contracts from the viewpoint of jurisprudents. The research method is librarian and by using of appropriate.In this writing we described lien. Results showed that enforcement domain of the lien is not limited to sale contract; rather it involves other contracts such as rentand mutual interest settlement. Some of its consequences are its deposition on the lienclaimer and lacking of need to bring a suit and the court sentence for enforcing it.

Nowadays disruptions in the type of interactions and the level of independence have led to a transformation in the law of contracts.The most significant of these manifestations is represented in the increasing number of limitations placed on the freedom of contracts.In fact, in the modern society, owing to significant differences in the individual's bargaining power and disruption in the balance of contract, on the one hand, and specialization of affairs, on the other, absolute deference to this principle would probably defeat its own purpose; not only will it not increase public welfare, but also it will worsen the hardships and difficulties facing consumers.In modern law, limitations are imposed on the freedom of contract not only to prevent the making of contracts harmful to society, but sometimes it also requires individuals to conclude a contract or to accept the terms of the contract or to choose the other party to the point of impinging on the freedom of individuals.Therefore, compulsory contracts are the result of limitations on the concept of the freedom of contract and its territory is a function of the economic and social necessities of each country.

Due to inadequate public financial status and increasing demand for infrastructure facilities, many governments worldwide are exploring new arrangements through Public Private Partnerships (PPP). However, PPP approach is not applicable for all projects and investors may pay a lot of time and money for preparation for a tender that may not have adequate return back. Therefore, private investors seek a model to support them in deciding whether the bid or no-bid in a PPP tender. This paper presents a decision support system based on MADM decision-making models to evaluate the Cost Opportunity of tenders. Utilizing the proposed model, private investors can rank the PPP tenders and select the most tender with the least cost opportunity. Applying the proposed model to eleven Iranian PPP project in the field of water and power plant, prove that private investor decides to bid in a tender not only for fiscal attracters of the project, but also they consider how public authority is organized and committed to responsibilities. The public party can improve the success chance of PPP tenders by offering some incentives and advocating de-risking mechanisms.‎